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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are frustrated because they are feeling the economic pinch that
comes with high gasoline prices and because they cannot get to the bottom of
why prices are so high. People disagree about whom to blame for high gaso-
line prices and about how to remedy the problem. Some blame increased
demand for oil combined with limited supply.' Others blame environmental
regulations.' Still others blame collaborations between major oil companies.3
In fact, recent news that one major oil company realized record annual profits
has added to the public's frustration4 and has led Congress to question oil com-
pany executives about the impact of their collaborations on gasoline prices. 5
If inappropriate collaboration between major oil companies is to blame,
then antitrust law is the vehicle for exposing the culprits and remedying public
frustration. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence
has failed to fuel this vehicle. The Court's scheme for interpreting antitrust law
has steered away from Congress' purpose in enacting antitrust laws. The
Court's scheme is ambiguous and has left lower courts without a roadmap
showing how to navigate antitrust disputes. The Supreme Court needs to tune-
up its antitrust jurisprudence by adopting a test that is flexible enough to apply
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I See, e.g., Christopher Helman, Why $45 Oil Is Good for You, FORBES, Oct. 18, 2004, at
90, 90-96 (blaming rising gasoline prices on increased demand and limited supply).
2 See, e.g., Public Citizen, Mergers, Manipulation and Mirages: How Oil Companies Keep
Gasoline Prices High, and Why the Energy Bill Doesn't Help (March 2004), http://www.
citizen.org/documents/oilmergers.pdf (disagreeing with those, including the Bush adminis-
tration, who claim that environmental regulations are the true blame behind high gasoline
prices) [hereinafter Mergers, Manipulation and Mirages].
I See id. (blaming rising gasoline prices on the fact that "the largest oil companies have
merged with one another, creating just a handful of oil monopolies that control significant
chunks of the American oil and gas markets.").
4 See Chris Isidore, Exxon Mobil Sets Profit Record: Nation's No. 1 Oil Company Reports
Larger than Expected Jump in 4Q Income to Cap Record Year, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 30,
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/30/news/companies/exxonearns/.
' See Jad Mouawad, A Senate Panel Interrogates Wary Oil Executives, N.Y. TiMES, Mar.
15, 2006, at C4.
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to a wide variety of antitrust disputes, yet certain enough to guide lower courts
towards consistency.
In February 2006, the Court decided Texaco Inc. v. Dagher.6 In Texaco v.
Dagher, plaintiff service station owners alleged that Shell and Texaco, who had
formed a joint venture, fixed gasoline prices in violation of antitrust law.7
Though the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that defendants' actions constituted price-
fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act § 1.8 The Supreme Court framed
the issue in Texaco v. Dagher as a joint venture "setting" a price for its prod-
uct.9 In an opinion written by Justice Thomas,' ° the Court found that the joint
venture's act of setting a price for its product could not be illegal per se. 1
The facts giving rise to Texaco v. Dagher exposed the problems with the
Court's antitrust jurisprudence and provided the Court an opportunity to fix
those problems. Since the Court did not fix its antitrust jurisprudence in
Dagher, the public's frustration over high gasoline prices and judicial uncer-
tainty about Sherman Act §1 analysis continues.
As evidenced in Texaco v. Dagher, the Court's current scheme often leads
to one of two outcomes: first, the Court's scheme may discount a defendant's
legitimate justifications for alleged Sherman Act violations; and second, the
Court's current scheme may dissuade a plaintiff from pursuing claims that
could hold major corporate defendants accountable for potential Sherman Act
violations."2 These ineffective outcomes have left some people frustrated
because they suspect that inappropriate oil company collaborations have led to
high gasoline prices.' 3 Under the current interpretive scheme, oil companies
may get by with fixing gasoline prices in such a way that would have anticom-
petitive effects.
The Court could fix this problem by adopting a modified scheme to ana-
lyze Sherman Act §1 disputes. This modified scheme should ease the plain-
tiffs burden of proof without discounting the defendant's legitimate
justifications.
Part II of this Note briefly traces the historical development of Sherman
Act §1 jurisprudence. This section explores the Court's development of two
6 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).
7 Id.
8 Id.
I See id.
1O All other members of the Court joined the opinion, except that Justice Alito, who took no
part in the consideration or decision of this case.
" Texaco, 126 S. Ct. at 1281.
12 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 793-94 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the traditional rule of reason requires an antitrust plaintiff to present
every possible fact and theory, and that the case never reaches a conclusion); Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among Competitors, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 1137, 1153 (2001) ("The quick look is more favorable to plaintiffs than the tradi-
tional rule of reason. Because it is so difficult to make a prima facie case under the rule of
reason, a defendant rarely has to prove a justification for its conduct.").
1" See, e.g., Mergers, Manipulation and Mirages, supra note 2 (blaming rising gasoline
prices on the fact that "the largest oil companies have merged with one another, creating just
a handful of oil monopolies that control significant chunks of the American oil and gas
markets").
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methods for analyzing § 1 disputes and compares the application of these meth-
ods in an older line of Supreme Court decisions, from 1940 through 1969, with
a more recent line of decisions, from 1979 to 1999. Part III of this Note exam-
ines the recent analysis of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in Texaco v.
Dagher. Part IV proposes a modified § 1 test and argues that the Court should
explicitly adopt the modified test.
II. BACKGROUND
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled with the language of the Sherman
Act throughout the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, the
Court provided certainty by interpreting the statute's language literally. By the
end of the century, the Court had created confusion by applying multiple tests
to various antitrust disputes, depending on the factual context of each dispute.
A. Early History
The Sherman Act provides in §1, "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."' 4
Congress enacted the Antitrust Act, as the Sherman Act was originally
called, in 1890. Shortly thereafter, in 1897, the Court began wrestling with the
statute's language in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association. 15
The Court construed the statute's language strictly, concluding that the word
"every" gave the statute broad application. 6 Under this broad application, the
Court concluded that disputed price agreements between competing railroads
were illegal regardless of the intentions of the railroad companies. ' 7
But as early as 1918 the Court began to admit that this broad application
of the statute's language was problematic. 18 In Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, the Court held that if it read § 1 of the Sherman Act literally, then
every contract would be found to be a violation because every contract is an
agreement that restrains trade.' 9 In Chicago Board of Trade, the Court found
that a Chicago grain market rule, which literally restrained trade by regulating
14 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
15 166 U.S. 290, 327-28 (1897).
16 Id. However, Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, argued for a narrower application,
reasoning that the Antitrust Act was a codification of longstanding common law that
included the rule of reason. Justice White concluded that the original statute's language
"every restraint of trade" must be construed to exclude reasonable contracts. Id. at 343-54
(White, J., dissenting).
The plain intention of the law was to protect the liberty of contract and the freedom of trade.
Will this intention not be frustrated by a construction which, if it does not destroy, at least
gravely impairs, both the liberty of the individual to contract and the freedom of trade? If the
rule of reason no longer determines the right of the individual to contract, or secures the validity
of contracts upon which trade depends and results, what becomes of the liberty of the citizen or
of the freedom of trade?
Id. at 355.
'7 Id. at 341-42.
18 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
19 Id. ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence.").
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prices while the market was closed, did not violate the Sherman Act.20 The
Board had adopted a rule requiring its members who made grain transactions
after the market closed for business on a given day to do so only under the
market's closing price from that day.2 ' Before the Board adopted this rule,
members were free to negotiate prices even for after-hours transactions.22 The
United States brought an action against the Board, alleging that its rule was an
illegal trade restraint under the Antitrust Act.23 In its opinion, the Court nar-
rowed its application of the statute by analyzing the reasonableness of the
restraint, finding that cases like this one turn on "whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."24 The Court
found the Board's rule was reasonable under the Antitrust Act.25
As a result of its holding in Chicago Board of Trade, the Court has articu-
lated two methods for determining if a restraint is actually illegal under § 1 of
the Sherman Act: the "per se" rule, which applies to restraints that are so
plainly anticompetitive that they are illegal per se; and the rule of reason, which
applies to restraints whose competitive effects can only be evaluated by analyz-
ing the specific facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed.26 Whether a court analyzes a restraint under
the "per se" rule or under the rule of reason, the underlying purpose of the
analysis is always to form a judgment about the "competitive significance" of
the restraint.27
The rule of reason test is a balancing test that begins with the burden on
the plaintiff to establish the anticompetitive effects of the restraint at issue. Part
of the plaintiff's burden is to establish that the defendant has sufficient market
power to make the restraint truly anticompetitive. A plaintiff s burden of proof
is often very heavy because of the necessity to establish the defendant's market
power.2 8 Justice Brandeis described the traditional rule of reason by saying:
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.2 9
20 Id.
21 Id. at 237.
22 id.
23 id.
24 Id. at 238.
25 Id. at 239.
26 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
27 Id. (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
28 Piraino, supra note 12, at 1154.
29 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977) (quoting Chicago Bd.
of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238). The rule of reason was a common law principle that pre-dates
the Antirust Act, and can be traced back at least until the 1711 English case Mitchel v.
Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 (1711). See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-89.
[Vol. 7:593
GASOLINE PRICES AND ANTITRUST
When analyzing § 1 disputes, courts now must make a threshold determi-
nation of whether the "per se" rule or the rule of reason applies.3 °
B. Line of Cases Applying the "Per Se" Rule to Price Fixing
Another line of Supreme Court decisions, spanning the time period from
1940 through 1969, shows a historical trend toward applying the "per se" rule
whenever price fixing, or a similar naked restraint, is at issue.3 ' In this line of
decisions, the Court steadfastly adhered to its own longstanding precedent by
applying the "per se" rule whenever analyzing price fixing under §1 of the
Sherman Act.
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, the Court held price-
fixing agreements to be unlawful per se without requiring specific evidence of
anticompetitive effects. 32 In Socony-Vacuum, the defendant oil companies vio-
lated the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the tank car prices of gasoline.3 3
The Court held the agreements to be illegal per se because it wanted to adhere
to the same "per se" rule for price fixing it had consistently applied for the
preceding forty years.34
30 The Sherman Act clearly made price fixing between separate business entities a "per se"
violation. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 115 (2004); see, e.g., Citizen Publ'g Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136 (1969); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290, 341-42 (1897). However, when separate business entities form a merger, and the
merger allegedly fixes prices for its products, courts commonly evaluate these actions under
the rule of reason. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra; see, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984) (finding that § 1 "leaves untouched a single firm's
anticompetitive conduct (short of threatening monopolization) that may be indistinguishable
in economic effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § I liability"). Joint ventures,
though, present a middle ground. Joint ventures do not automatically qualify for either "per
se" analysis or for rule of reason analysis. When a joint venture allegedly fixes prices, the
Court has struggled to determine when to apply the "per se" rule and when to apply the rule
of reason. W. Stephen Smith, Can a Fully Integrated Joint Venture Be Per Se Unlawful?
The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Dagher, ANTITRUST, Spring 2005, at 53 (citing United States
v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), and United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967),
as examples of the Supreme Court applying the "per se" rule to joint ventures; and citing
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and Nw. Wholesale Station-
ers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), as examples of the Supreme
Court applying the rule of reason to joint ventures). Historically, the determinative issue has
been whether the restraint is necessary to allow the joint venture to perform its legitimate
functions. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steele Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Under the ancillary restraint doctrine, if the restraint is necessary
for the joint venture's legitimate functions, it is called an "ancillary" restraint. The Court has
traditionally applied the rule of reason to ancillary restraints. Neal R. Stoll & Shepard
Goldfein, "Catch 22" for Joint Ventures, 231 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2004) (citing XI HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1904, at 203 (1998)). On the other hand, if the restraint is
independent of the joint venture's legitimate functions, it is called a "naked" restraint. Stoll
& Goldfein, supra. The Court has traditionally applied the "per se" rule to naked restraints.
Id.
31 Piraino, supra note 12, at 1144; Smith, supra note 30, at 53.
32 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
33 Id. at 166.
34 Id. at 218 (citing United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)).
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In United States v. Sealy, Inc., the Court also held price-fixing to be a "per
se" violation and refused to inquire into economic justification, market impact,
or reasonableness. 35 In Sealy, the defendant mattress company violated the
Sherman Act by conspiring to fix prices for its products and by allocating
mutually exclusive territories among its manufacturers. 36 The Court reasoned
that Sealy's actions were illegal "per se" under what it described as a "settled
doctrine."3 7
In Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States the Court found that two Tuc-
son, Arizona, newspapers that formed a "joint operating agreement" fixing a
common price for both newspapers were guilty of a "per se" violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act.38 In Citizen Publishing, the Star and the Citizen newspapers,
once "vigorous competitors" in the Tucson newspaper market, agreed to form
Tucson Newspapers, Inc., to manage the production and distribution of both
newspapers. 39 Both the Star and the Citizen retained their respective news and
editorial departments and their respective corporate identities.4" The joint
operating agreement unified pricing between the two newspapers in an attempt
to end competition between them.4 1 The newspapers' combined profits subse-
quently rose from $27,531 in 1940 to $1,727,217 in 1964.42 The Court found
the agreement illegal per se because the "joint operating agreement exposed the
restraints so clearly and unambiguously as to justify the rather rare use of a
summary judgment in the antitrust field."4 3
The line of cases represented by Socony-Vacuum Oil, Sealy, and Citizen
Publishing Co. demonstrates that from 1940 through 1969, the Court applied
the "per se" rule whenever § 1 defendants had engaged in price fixing.44
C. Line of Cases Showing Modern Trend Toward Applying the Rule of
Reason
In a more recent line of decisions, spanning the time period from 1979
through 1999, the Court applied the rule of reason to Sherman Act §1 cases it
previously would have analyzed under the "per se" rule.45 In this recent line of
cases, the Court has departed from its automatic application of the "per se" rule
" United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967).
36 Id. at 351.
37 Id. at 357.
38 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
39 Id. at 133-34.
40 Id. at 133.
41 Id. at 134.
42 ld.
43 Id. at 136 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
4 See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136 (1969); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 218 (1940).
45 Piraino, supra note 12, at 1146; Smith, supra note 30, at 54.
[Vol. 7:593
Spring 2007] GASOLINE PRICES AND ANTITRUST 599
to price-fixing disputes.4 6 Further, the Court has implicitly adopted a modifica-
tion to the traditional rule of reason that it applies in specific circumstances.
4 7
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System is the first in a
series of Supreme Court decisions that represents a trend toward applying the
rule of reason even in situations where the Court would have previously applied
the "per se" rule.4 8 In BMI, the Court held that blanket licenses for songs and
other artistic creations were not "per se" violations of §1 of the Sherman Act
though they did involve price fixing.49 CBS, a major television network,
brought an action against BMI alleging, inter alia, that BMI was an illegal
monopoly and that its blanket license product fixed prices in violation of the
Sherman Act. 50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether
the blanket license constituted a "per se" violation.5 1
The Court justified applying the less stringent rule of reason because it
found a practical necessity for the existence of blanket licenses.5 2 The Court
characterized blanket licenses as being useful tools that prevented unauthorized
copyright instead of being naked trade restraints that stifled competition.
53
The Court also justified applying the less stringent rule of reason because
all three branches of government had previously approved blanket licenses.5 4
The judicial branch had approved blanket licenses when courts granted consent
decrees to BMI in order to regulate blanket licenses.5 The executive branch
had approved blanket licenses when the Department of Justice approved those
judicial consent decrees and filed an amicus brief in BMI arguing that blanket
licenses were not "per se" violations of the Sherman Act.5 6 The legislative
branch had approved blanket licenses when Congress enacted the Federal Cop-
yright Act.
5 7
46 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 762-81 (1999); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
47 See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (finding that "when there is an agreement not to com-
pete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement'" (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); see also Piraino, supra note 12, at 1154. The
Court applies the modified analysis whenever "an observer with even a rudimentary under-
standing of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets." Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770.
48 Smith, supra note 30, at 53 (considering the Supreme Court's treatment of joint ventures
specifically). Other commentators suggest the real transition can be traced to the Court's
decision in Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 (1977), where the Court
held that "the legality of non-price vertical restraints is to be judged under a rule-of-reason
standard." See Ardath A. Hamann, Imposing a Maximum Retail Price: Is It a Per Se Viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act? 1 PREVIEW U.S. SuP. CT. CAs. 4-7, (Sept. 18, 1997); see
also Piraino, supra note 12, at 1145.
49 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979).
50 Id. at 6.
5' Id. at 7.
52 Id. at 20.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 10-16.
55 Id. at 12 n.20.
56 Id. at 14-15.
57 Id. at 15.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
The Court made a monumental shift in its Sherman Act § 1 jurisprudence
by not automatically finding price-fixing to be illegal per se. The Court parted
from seventy-five years of its own precedent by analyzing whether price-fixing
was necessary in a particular case. This monumental shift began a new trend
that would continue into the following decades.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the outcome, but
argued that the Court should have performed the "rule of reason" analysis itself
instead of remanding.58 Justice Stevens' belief that the Court should have
resolved the Sherman Act issue itself suggests that the "per se" test and the
"rule of reason" test should not be treated as alternative theories since the Court
created these two tests to analyze disputes under the Sherman Act. Instead,
Justice Stevens treated the two tests as part of one continuous spectrum of
analysis.
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma the Court again applied the "rule of reason" test.59 In
NCAA, the Court evaluated an NCAA policy for alleged antitrust violations.60
The disputed policy limited the number of televised football games available to
broadcasters and consumers.6 1 The Court admitted that the policy was the type
of restraint that the Court had previously found illegal per se.62 Yet, the Court
did not apply "per se" analysis.6 3 The Court justified applying the rule of rea-
son because college football, which requires a league of teams, is the kind of
industry in which restraints are necessary for its product, college football
games, to be available in the first place.' The Court cited its reasoning in BMI
v. CBS in support of its decision.65
In applying the rule of reason here, though, the Court implicitly made a
significant modification by not requiring the plaintiff to establish the defen-
dant's market power66 to meet its burden of proof.67 The effect was that the
plaintiffs burden of proof became much lighter than under the traditional rule
of reason:
In the typical rule of reason case, the plaintiff bears the burden at the outset of estab-
lishing the anticompetitive effects of the restraint at issue, including proof of the
58 Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
60 id. at 88.
61 Id. at 99-100.
62 Id. at 99-100. The Court noted that the District Court even found some of the restraints
to be horizontal price fixing, "perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade."
Id.
63 Id. at 100.
64 Id. at 101.
65 Id. at 103.
66 The rule of reason test is a balancing test that begins with the burden on the plaintiff to
establish the anticompetitive effects of the restraint at issue. Part of the plaintiffs burden is
to establish that the defendant has sufficient market power to make the restraint truly
anticompetitive. Plaintiffs burden of proof is often very heavy because of the necessity to
establish defendant's market power. Piraino, supra note 12, at 1154.
67 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (finding that "when there is an agree-
ment not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."' (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978))).
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defendant's market power. Some courts have recently adopted a variation of the rule
of reason, called the "quick look," which absolves the plaintiff of such a burden.
Under the quick look, the plaintiff need merely prove that a restraint is of a type that
is likely to have anticompetitive effects. After such a showing, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a procompetitive justification for the restraint.
The quick look is more favorable to plaintiffs than the traditional rule of reason.
Because it is so difficult to make a prima facie case under the rule of reason, a
defendant rarely has to prove a justification for its conduct. In quick look cases,
however, the defendant has to present some evidence of the procompetitive nature of
a restraint in order to avoid its invalidation.
68
In explaining why it modified the rule of reason, the Court referred to
National Society of Professional Engineers as precedent that the real test
underlying all Sherman Act § 1 analysis is the "competitive significance" of the
restraint at issue.69 The Court explained that because there is no bright line
separating the "per se" test from the "rule of reason" test anyway, and because
both tests are part of a continuous spectrum of analysis, the Court may modify
its own scheme for evaluating Sherman Act §1 issues.70 Five years earlier,
Justice Stevens came to the same conclusion in his BMI v.CBS dissent when he
opined that the Court, while rejecting "per se" analysis, should have gone ahead
and applied the rule of reason itself instead of remanding.
71
Two years after NCAA, the Court again applied its modified "rule of rea-
son" test in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.7 2 In
Indiana Federation of Dentists, a group of Indiana dentists formed an agree-
ment with each other to withhold patient x-rays from insurance companies who
requested the x-rays to evaluate the patient's claims.7 3 These dentists formed
this agreement because they viewed the insurance companies' requests as a
threat to the dentists' professional independence. 74 The Federal Trade Com-
mission alleged that the dentists' agreement suppressed competition in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The Court analogized the dentists' actions to a "group
boycott."'75 Group boycotts had previously been "per se" violations of the
Sherman Act.76 Nevertheless, the Court applied the rule of reason, stating that
it did not want to expand the "per se" rule to the facts at hand.7 7
Though the Court never used the term "quick look," the Court described
its application of the rule of reason to the facts at hand as "not a matter of any
68 Piraino, supra note 12, at 1153.
69 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692).
70 Id. at 104 n.26.
71 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
72 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
73 Id. at 455.
74 Id. at 449.
75 Id. at 458.
76 Id. (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)).
77 Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458-59. The court reasoned that "per se" analysis was
not appropriate because it did not want. to force the disputed restraints into the "boycott
pigeonhole," because it did not want to condemn a professional association's rules without
more elaborate analysis, and because the economic impacts of these restraints were not
"immediately obvious." Id.
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great difficulty. '78 The Court stated that absent a countervailing procompeti-
rive virtue such as the ones found in BMI or NCAA, the dentists' actions ille-
gally restrained trade.7 9 The Court did not require an "elaborate market
analysis," which is often required under the traditional rule of reason, to reach
its conclusion of illegality.8 ° Once again, the Court was rejecting "per se"
analysis and instead applying modified rule of reason analysis to resolve a
Sherman Act issue.
In the 1999 California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission
opinion, the Court described its previous modified rule of reason analysis as a
"quick-look" analysis.8" The Court found quick-look analysis appropriate
whenever "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompeti-
tive effect on customers and markets."82 The Court applied traditional "rule of
reason" analysis, though, because it found that the facts of this case did not
qualify for "quick-look" analysis.83 The dispute in California Dental arose
when a group of California dentists agreed to a code of ethics that contained
guidelines concerning appropriate advertising.84 The Federal Trade Commis-
sion brought a complaint against this group of dentists alleging that the adver-
tising guidelines touched price and quality to an extent sufficient to qualify as
unlawful restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.85 Though the Ninth Circuit
upheld the guidelines, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Ninth Cir-
cuit failed to perform a sufficiently thorough analysis of the guidelines' eco-
nomic impact.86
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer explained why he would have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision and upheld the guidelines. Apparently
advocating for a modified analysis, Justice Breyer broke the "rule of reason"
test down into four analytical questions: "(1) What is the specific restraint at
issue? (2) What are the likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting
procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have sufficient market power
to make a difference?"87 Justice Breyer then argued that his four-question test,
and its accompanying
allocation of the burdens of persuasion, reflects a gradual evolution within the courts
over a period of many years. That evolution represents an effort carefully to blend
the procompetitive objectives of the law of antitrust with administrative necessity. It
represents a considerable advance, both from the days when the Commission had to
78 Id. at 459.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 460.
81 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (citing Nat'l Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 679 (1978); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100; Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 447; Law v.
NCAA., 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658,
669 (3rd Cir. 1993); Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir.
1992)).
82 Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770.
83 Id. at 771.
84 Id. at 759-60.
85 Id. at 762.
86 Id. at 769-81.
87 Id. at 782 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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present and/or refute every possible fact and theory, and from antitrust theories so
abbreviated as to prevent proper analysis. The former prevented cases from ever
reaching a conclusion .... and the latter called for the criticism that "Government
always wins."
88
In the line of cases represented by BMI, NCAA, Indiana Federation of
Dentists, and California Dental, the Court has departed from its application of
"per se" analysis to price-fixing cases and has, in limited circumstances, used a
modified "rule of reason" analysis.89 In 1999 Justice Breyer appeared to advo-
cate for more widespread use of this modified analysis. 90
Over the past one hundred years, the Court's § 1 jurisprudence has evolved
from literal analysis of the statute's language to multiple methods of analyzing
disputes. Confusion has replaced certainty.
III. TEXACO V. DAGHER
A. Facts
Texaco v. Dagher arose from a group of gasoline station owners alleging
that two major oil companies, Shell and Texaco, fixed prices in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.9 1 Shell and Texaco were once "fierce competitors" in the
national gasoline market.92 In 1998, Shell and Texaco agreed to form two joint
ventures: Equilon in the western United States, and Motiva in the eastern
United States. 93 The joint ventures constituted 15% of the nation's gasoline
sales market. In the western states, Equilon had an even higher market share of
over 25%.9'
Either immediately before Shell and Texaco formed the joint ventures or
sometime shortly thereafter, "a decision was made that the Shell and Texaco
brands would have the same price in the same market areas."9 5 Though Shell
and Texaco claimed that these joint ventures would save $800 million in costs
88 Id. at 793-94.
89 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 762-81; Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458-59;
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979);
see, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (finding that "when there is an
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement'" (quoting Nat'l
Soc. of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); see also Piraino, supra
note 12, at 1154.
90 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 782-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91 Dagher v. Saudi Ref. Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1111.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1112.
The decision to charge the same price for the two distinct brands "was developed as sort of an
operating requirement right from the very start or near to the very start of the alliance." Equilon
and Motiva integrated this pricing decision into a project named "The Strategic Market Initia-
tive" (SMI), which sought to develop ways in which the alliance could produce and promote
both brands more competitively. There is some evidence in the record establishing that the
decision to set one price for the two brands was conceived of in the SMI even before Motiva was
formed.
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annually, Equilon raised its prices $.40 per gallon in Los Angeles and $.30 per
gallon in both Seattle and Portland during a time when crude oil prices reached
near-historic lows.
96
Twenty-three thousand Shell and Texaco service station owners com-
menced a civil action against Shell, Texaco, and the joint venture in the Central
District of California.9 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fixed prices
in what constituted a "per se" violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.98 The plain-
tiffs pleaded, in the alternative, that the defendants violated the Sherman Act
based on "quick-look" analysis. 9 9
B. District Court Holding
The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the
motion, finding that the rule of reason, not the "per se" rule, governed the
Sherman Act analysis of these joint ventures, and that the joint ventures should
not be subject to "per se" analysis for setting a price for its products. 1°°
Because the court viewed the "per se" test and the "rule of reason" test as
alternative theories, and because plaintiffs did not make a claim under the rule
of reason test, the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.10 1
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit.'
0 2
C. Ninth Circuit Holding
In an opinion written by Judge Reinhardt, the Ninth Circuit panel noted
that price-fixing agreements are illegal per se under the Sherman Act.' 0 3 The
court characterized the defendants' position as asking the court to create an
exception to this rule for joint ventures, a position which the court found incon-
sistent with the Sherman Act."°
The court found compelling similarities between the facts of this case and
the facts of Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States.' 5 The court found that in
96 Id. at 1111-13.
97 Id. at 1113.
98 Id.
99 Id.
'oo Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1113. A joint venture does not automatically qualify for either "per
se" analysis or for rule of reason analysis. Instead, the determinative issue is whether the
restraint in question is a naked restraint or an ancillary restraint. Under the ancillary restraint
doctrine, if the restraint is naked, then the Court has traditionally applied the "per se" rule. If
the restraint is ancillary, then the Court has traditionally applied the rule of reason. Stoll &
Goldfein, supra note 30.
l' Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1113.
102 Id. at 1110.
103 Id. at 1116.
'" Id. When a joint venture is the defendant in § 1 dispute, courts have struggled to deter-
mine when to apply the "per se" rule and when to apply the rule of reason. Smith, supra
note 30, at 53 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), and United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), as examples of the Supreme Court applying the "per se"
rule to joint ventures; also citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1
(1979), and Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985), as examples of the Supreme Court applying the rule of reason to joint ventures).
105 Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1118-19 (citing Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
135 (1969)).
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Dagher, as in Citizen Publishing, "the confluence of these anticompetitive
restraints, in the context of a joint venture between two formerly-vigorous com-
petitors in the market area targeted by the venture, constituted a 'per se' viola-
tion of the Sherman Act."'
10 6
Judge Reinhardt also found that the district court failed to consider the
disputed facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as it must when consid-
ering defendants' motion for summary judgment.'0 7 Specifically, the district
court should have considered the timing of the decision to set a common price
for Shell's and Texaco's products, a disputed issue of material fact, in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs.10 8
The court also focused on whether the setting of common prices for Shell
and Texaco gasoline was "necessary" to the legitimate aims of the joint ven-
ture.' 0 9 The court found that the burden of establishing such necessity should
fall on the defendants." 10
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence of
anticompetitive effects, and that defendants had not responded with sufficient
evidence of procompetitive justification for initiating the price-fixing
scheme."' Consequently, the court found the "per se" rule applicable." 2
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fernandez characterized the defendants'
actions as those of a joint venture merely setting a price for its product, which
was an integral part of running its business." 3 Judge Fernandez argued that
such an integral part of running a business cannot be a "per se" violation of the
Sherman Act. "'
D. Supreme Court Holding
Defendants appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision, and the United State
Supreme Court granted certiorari.' The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision using reasoning similar to the Ninth Circuit's dissenting opinion." 6
The Supreme Court explained its own evolution toward rule of reason analysis
by saying, "this Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under
which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combi-
nation is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found
unlawful."" 7 The Court acknowledged that price-fixing is an exception to the
presumption that the rule of reason applies." 8 But because the Court framed
the present issue as a joint venture setting a price for its product, the Court
106 Id. at 1119 (citing Citizen Publ'g Co., 394 U.S. at 135).
107 Id. at 1120.
108 Id.
'09 Id. at 1121.
"O Id. at 1121 n.14.
.'' Id. at 1122.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 1127 (Fernandez, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
14 Id.
'15 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 545 U.S. 1138 (2005); Shell Oil Co. v. Dagher, 545 U.S. 1138
(2005).
116 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).
117 Id. at 1279.
118 Id.
Spring 20071
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
presumed that the rule of reason applied to this case.'19 Because the Court
framed the issue this way, it refused to consider the possibility that Shell and
Texaco had decided to fix prices independently from their decision to form a
joint venture. ' 20
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Under Traditional §1 Analysis, Framing the Issue is Outcome
Determinative.
As the disagreement between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
illustrates, this case gets caught in the middle ground between the two methods
of §1 analysis. 12' The Supreme Court, in its struggle to interpret §1's lan-
guage, "Every contract ... in restraint of trade ...is hereby declared to be
illegal,"' 2 2 has held that §1 cannot mean what its plain language says. 23 In an
attempt to resolve this interpretive struggle, the Court has adopted a "per se"
test and a "rule of reason" test.124 This case can arguably fit under either test.
Plaintiffs frame the issue as two oil companies fixing a common price for gaso-
line, which would be a "per se" violation under the Court's historical analy-
sis. 125 Defendants frame the issue as a joint venture merely setting a price for
its product, an activity that can only be analyzed under the balancing test of the
rule of reason. 126 Despite the extensive record, the facts are ambiguous enough
to allow the parties to frame the issue either way. 127 Both parties realize what
the Court must now face: the framing of the issue determines the outcome
under the Court's traditional §1 analysis.
If the Court had framed the issue of this case as Shell and Texaco agreeing
to set a common price for their products, independently from their decision to
form a joint venture, then the restraint would have been classified under the
ancillary restraints doctrine as a "naked" restraint.' 28 Naked restraints have
always qualified for "per se" analysis. 129 If plaintiffs were able to prove at trial
that Shell and Texaco agreed to set a common price for their products indepen-
dently from the decision to form a joint venture, then the Court would find
defendants guilty of a "per se" violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit. Since the
"9 id. at 1279-80.
120 Id.
121 Compare Texaco v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. at 1280, with Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1122.
122 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
123 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
124 See id.
125 Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1110.
126 Id. at 1111.
127 See id. (finding the record in this case to be "voluminous"). Compare id. at 1122
(majority opinion), with id. at 1127 (Fernandez, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
128 If a restraint is independent of the joint venture's legitimate functions, it is called a
"naked" restraint. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 30.
129 The district court here determined that the restraint was naked, but inexplicably refused
to apply the "per se" rule, instead granting summary judgment on behalf of defendants. See
Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 30.
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Ninth Circuit denied summary judgment and remanded, this case would have
moved on to trial.
But because the Supreme Court framed the issue in this case as a joint
venture making a business decision to price its product, the Court refused to
apply the ancillary restraint doctrine to this case.' 3 0 The Court found that even
if it did apply the ancillary restraint doctrine, that the restraint at issue would be
classified as an "ancillary" restraint. 13' Ancillary restraints qualify for "rule of
reason" analysis.' 32 The court refused to find the joint venture's decision to set
a price for its product to be illegal per se. Because courts view the "per se" test
and the "rule of reason" test as alternative theories, the plaintiffs lost because
they did not bring an alternative claim under the "rule of reason" test.
However, this analysis is further complicated because courts have applied
more than one kind of "rule of reason" test. Courts have applied both a tradi-
tional "rule of reason" test and a modified "rule of reason" test. Here, plaintiffs
did make a claim, in the alternative, that this case be considered under the
"quick-look" approach. 133 The quick-look approach is a modified "rule of rea-
son" test."' Solely because it had applied the "per se" rule, the Ninth Circuit
refused to perform the alternatively pleaded quick-look analysis. 135 Thus, once
the Supreme Court framed the issue as a joint venture making a business deci-
sion to price its product, then it had to determine whether to apply traditional
"rule of reason" analysis, or the modified quick-look.
Because the Court decided that the traditional "rule of reason" test applied
here, the plaintiffs lost because they did not bring such an alternative claim. 136
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's opinion. The
defendants prevailed.
If, instead, the Court had decided to apply a modified "rule of reason"
analysis, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to this analysis because they
raised the quick-look as an alternative. Accordingly, the Court would have
remanded to the Ninth Circuit for application of modified "rule of reason"
analysis.
Consequently, this case was subject to a complicated procedural quagmire
under traditional §1 analysis. This quagmire can be traced back to the Court's
finding that §1 cannot be read literally, which led to the distinction between
"per se" and "rule of reason" analysis.137 Over time the footing became trick-
ier as the Court distinguished between the traditional and modified rules of
reason. 138 The undesirable result in this case is that issue-framing determined
which method of analysis the Court applied, which in turn determined the
outcome.
130 Dagher, 126 S. Ct. at 1279-80.
131 Id. at 1281. If a restraint is necessary for the joint venture's legitimate functions, it is
called an "ancillary" restraint. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 30.
132 Id.
133 Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1113.
134 Piraino, supra note 12, at 1144.
135 Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1116 n.7.
136 See Dagher, 126 S. Ct. at 1280 n.2.
13' See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
138 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984); see also Piraino, supra
note 12, at 1154.
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B. The Supreme Court Should Explicitly Simplify and Clarify Its §1
Analysis
1. Problematic Aspects of the Traditional Scheme
The facts in Texaco v. Dagher provide a clear illustration of the problems
with the Supreme Court's traditional scheme for analyzing alleged §1 viola-
tions. If the Court had framed the issue as two oil companies fixing a common
price for gasoline, then the plaintiffs would have won. Because the Court
framed the issue as a joint venture setting a price for its gasoline, the defend-
ants won. Because the facts were ambiguous enough to allow the Court to
frame the issue either way,' 39 the decision of how to frame the issue was out-
come determinative.
Until the late 1970s, the Court consistently applied the "per se" rule to
price fixing and other naked restraints on trade.' 4° Over the past twenty-five
years, however, the Court has moved away from "per se" analysis by consist-
ently applying a more elaborate analysis of § 1 disputes.'4 1
Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion in California Dental, explained
that the downfall of the "per se" rule is that it, in effect, always allows plaintiffs
to win.14 2 As the Ninth Circuit points out in Dagher, the Court has never
explicitly turned its back on the "per se" rule. 143 As its recent rulings suggest,
though, the Court seems to be leaving the rule behind.
When read literally, § 1 is itself a "per se" rule." The plain language says
"every contract ... in restraint of trade ... is declared to be illegal." 14 5 The
Court's determination that §1 cannot mean what its plain language says,
because such a reading would invalidate every contract, led to the eventual
erosion of §1 "per se" analysis. 146 In the Broadcast Music, NCAA, Indiana
Federation of Dentists line of cases, the Court eroded the "per se" rule with
139 See Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1112.
140 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 151 (1940) (holding price-
fixing agreements to be unlawful per se without specific evidence of anticompetitive
effects); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967) (rejecting the rule of reason
and holding price-fixing to be a "per se" violation); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131, 132 (1969) (finding that newspapers who fixed a common price had committed a
"per se" violation).
141 See generally Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (applying
traditional rule of reason); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986) (applying modified rule of reason); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
(applying modified rule of reason to horizontal restraints on competition); Broad. Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
142 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 794 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that the "per se"
rule is too abbreviated to allow proper analysis, and that the plaintiff always tends to win).
143 See Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1119.
144 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (holding that if
section 1 of the Sherman Act is read literally, the every contract would be found to be a
violation since every contract is an agreement that restrains trade).
145 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
146 See Piraino, supra note 12, at 1145-46; Smith, supra note 30, at 53.
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exceptions and swung its §1 jurisprudential pendulum toward more elaborate
analysis. '4 7
While the "per se" rule is susceptible to being overly broad in favor of § 1
plaintiffs, the opposite is true of the rule of reason. A practical problem of
proof accompanies the traditional rule of reason."a' This problem is likely to
dissuade plaintiffs from bringing § 1 actions because their burden of proof is
onerous under the rule of reason. Small business owners, such as the plaintiffs
in Dagher, will not likely be financially situated to bear their burden of proof
when going against large corporate defendants, such as the defendants in
Dagher. This practical problem of proof may explain why the plaintiffs in
Dagher failed to plead alternatively for traditional "rule of reason" analysis.
As a hypothetical example, suppose major oil company A and major oil
company B appear to have made an agreement to fix a common price for gaso-
line in a specific market. P, who has modest financial resources, brings suit
under §1 of the Sherman Act. If the court automatically applies the "per se"
rule because price-fixing is at issue, P is likely to prevail. Yet the court may
never get to the bottom of the anticompetitive significance of A's and B's
actions because the court deemed their actions illegal per se. It is at least plau-
sible that A and B set common prices and -that their actions did not actually
effect competition in that particular gasoline market.
If, on the other hand, the court applies the rule of reason to this same
hypothetical, then P will bear the burden of proving that A's and B's actions
actually had a significant anticompetitive effect on the specific market. This
proof will likely take an elaborate economic analysis. P will likely not be able
to bear this burden because P's financial resources are dwarfed by A's and B's.
A and B will be able to afford an adequate defense, but P will be left with a
practical problem of proof beyond P's ability to bear. Thus, A and B will
likely prevail. Once again the court may never get to the bottom of the
anticompetitive significance of A's and B's actions because P cannot afford to
pursue its claim fully.
This hypothetical illustrates that the current scheme is inadequate to deter-
mine the anticompetitive significance of a defendant's actions.14 9 As a result,
major oil companies could fix gasoline prices in such a way that would have
serious anticompetitive effects, yet the interpretive scheme could prevent plain-
tiffs, and ultimately the public, from obtaining relief.
In response to this practical problem of proof, courts and commentators
have modified the rule of reason. 5 ' The Supreme Court has implicitly adopted
14 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441
U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
148 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 794 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the traditional rule of reason requires an antitrust plaintiff to present
every possible fact and theory, and that the case never reaches a conclusion); Piraino, supra
note 12, at 1153 ("The quick look is more favorable to plaintiffs than the traditional rule of
reason. Because it is so difficult to make a prima facie case under the rule of reason, a
defendant rarely has to prove a justification for its conduct.").
149 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978) (citing
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
150 Piraino, supra note 12, at 1144.
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a modified rule of reason itself in recent decisions, 15 but the Court has only
applied the modification when the disputed restraint is obviously anticompeti-
tive.' 52 The identifying feature of the modified rule of reason is that it eases
the burden of proof on the plaintiff by not requiring the plaintiff to establish the
defendant's market power.'53 This modification often solves a plaintiff's prac-
tical problem of proof. When a plaintiff is able to meet the lighter demand of
the modified rule of reason, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate procompetitive reasons for the restraint. 154 However, plaintiffs
have not fully realized the benefits of the modified rule of reason because the
Court has restricted the test to restraints that are obviously anticompetitive. 5'
The Supreme Court should not hesitate to simplify and clarify its §1
scheme. The Court must take action in the interest of better determining the
competitive significance of trade restraints. Because the Court created the two
traditional methods for evaluating §1 disputes in the interest of determining
competitive significance of restraints, it is now time for the Court to modify its
scheme for the same reason.1 56 The Court has confessed that there is no bright
line separating the "per se" rule and the rule of reason anyway.' 57 If the Court
can develop a more workable scheme for evaluating competitive significance,
then it should. Such a development would be a healthy evolution in the Court's
Sherman Act jurisprudence.
The current gasoline price situation in the United States illustrates the
need for a more workable scheme for evaluating competitive significance. "Per
se" analysis, though plaintiff-friendly, fails to get to the bottom of the legiti-
macy of plaintiffs' claims. Conversely, traditional "rule of reason" analysis
leaves plaintiffs with a practical problem of proof beyond their ability to bear,
and also fails to get to the bottom of the legitimacy of plaintiffs' claims. Either
way, the Sherman Act's purpose of evaluating the competitive significance of
the restraint remains unsatisfied. Consequently, if major oil companies are
actually fixing prices in violation of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs are left without
a remedy, and the public is left to suffer the consequences.
2. Proposed Scheme
The Court can address the practical problem of proof by adopting a com-
mon modified scheme for evaluating all § 1 disputes. The scheme must relieve
151 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101; Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 455; Cal. Dental Ass'n,
526 U.S. at 793 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 771 (finding that on the facts before it, the Court
would apply the traditional rule of reason instead of the "quick-look" approach). The Court
applies the modified analysis whenever "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding
of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompeti-
tive effect on customers and markets." Id. at 770.
153 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (finding that "when there is an agreement not to compete in
terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement."' (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435
U.S. at 692)).
154 See Piraino, supra note 12, at 1154.
155 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770.
156 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691-92.
157 See NCAA, 526 U.S. at 104 n.26.
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plaintiffs of their onerous burden of proof whenever possible. It also must be
flexible enough to apply to the wide variety of §1 disputes and be certain
enough to give lower courts guidance.
The Court should explicitly adopt the following modified test as the stan-
dard for analyzing all §1 claims: First, a court must identify the specific
restraints at issue. 158 Second, a court must determine whether the restrictions
identified have the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition. 159 If
not, then the restraint is not a violation of § 1. If so, then the burden would shift
to the defendant to establish whether these restrictions might be justified by
other procompetitive tendencies or redeeming virtues.16 ° If defendant does not
meet this burden, then the restraint is a violation of § 1. If defendant meets this
burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prof-
fered justification is invalid. 6 ' If plaintiff demonstrates that proffered justifi-
cation is invalid, then the restraint is a violation of § 1. If plaintiff does not
demonstrate that the proffered justification is invalid, then the court must weigh
and balance the harm of the restraint against the benefit of the restraint under a
full "rule of reason" analysis.' 6 2
This proposed test is based, in part, on Justice Breyer's dissent in Califor-
nia Dental, along with the Court's modified analysis in both NCAA and in
Indiana Federation of Dentists.16 3 The proposed test would successfully alle-
viate the problematic outcomes of both the "per se" rule and the traditional rule
of reason. This proposed test can be applied consistently to all §1 disputes,
regardless of whether the "likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be
ascertained,"'" 6 because this proposed test includes a safety valve that releases
158 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"I See id. at 784; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459
(1986) (determining that the dentist federation's agreement to withhold x-rays from insur-
ance companies is anticompetitive); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 (determining that the "NCAA's
television plan has a significant potential for anticompetitive effects" because it "restrains
price and output").
16o See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 786 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Ind. Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459 (finding that the dentist federation's agreement to withhold x-rays
from insurance companies had no "procompetitive effect"); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 (finding
that the NCAA's television plan was not justified by any "procompetitive efficiencies").
161 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988).
162 See id. See also 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW T 1507b (1978).
163 Justice Breyer did not label his modified test as a quick-look, and the majority found his
modified test to be more than merely a quick-look, because his test included a consideration
of the defendant's market power. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 788-89 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). However, the Court's previous modified rule of reason opinions do not require market
power analysis. The Court stated in NCAA that "the absence of market power does not
justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an agreement
not to compete in terms of price or output, "no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109
(quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). The Court
also reasoned, "[w]e have never required proof of market power in such a case. This naked
restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a
detailed market analysis." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110. Thus, the test proposed here leaves out
Justice Breyer's consideration of market power.
16 Dagher v. Saudi Ref. Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1116 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cal. Dental
Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770). The Court also noted that the quick look analysis is appropriate
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certain cases, where the plaintiff does not demonstrate that defendant's prof-
fered justification is invalid, back into a traditional "rule of reason" analysis. 165
This proposed test is the next logical evolutionary step in the Court's §1
analysis, not a radical departure from previous schemes. 166 The test does what
the Court should have done in the first place: it gives lower courts a common
framework for analyzing all § 1 allegations. Because it provides the flexibility
and the certainty needed to analyze §1 claims adequately, this test should be
applied to all §1 disputes.
The proposed test provides flexibility sufficient to accommodate the vari-
ety of situations that may arise, even situations that obviously justify "per se"
analysis or "rule of reason" analysis. First, the test provides flexibility suffi-
cient to encompass obvious situations that used to fall legitimately under the
"per se" rule. These obvious situations will still be disposed of quickly under
the proposed test. For example, as one commentator hypothesized, if the U.S.'s
three major automobile manufacturers all formed a joint venture to sell cars at a
single, pre-determined price, courts used to quickly dispose of such outright
price-fixing under the "per se" rule.' 6 7 But even under modified rule of reason
analysis, a court could easily dispose of this obvious case "in the twinkling of
an eye." 168 Second, the test provides flexibility sufficient to encompass obvi-
ous situations that legitimately used to require extensive analysis under the rule
of reason. These obvious situations will still be analyzed under a careful bal-
ancing test because the proposed test provides a safety valve that releases such
obvious situations back into the full rule of reason analysis.
169
The proposed test also provides certainty sufficient to allow parties to
anticipate which restraints courts will deem illegal. Lower courts will know
how to analyze every § 1 dispute. Parties will no longer need to guess which
outcome-determinative method of analysis a court will apply. Instead, parties
can accurately predict the legitimacy of § 1 claims based on the proposed test.
3. Applying the Proposed Test to Texaco v. Dagher
Compared to the procedural quagmire into which this case sinks under the
traditional scheme, the proposed test would have provided solid ground on
which to analyze Texaco v. Dagher.
First, the Court would have determined what specific restraints were at
issue.. 70 Right away the Court would have identified the restraint as a common
price for Shell and Texaco gasoline resulting from the companies' joint ven-
ture. The Court would then have examined all of the facts surrounding the
forming of the joint venture and the setting of a common price. The Court
when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that
the arrangements in question have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets." Id.
165 See, e.g., Mass. Bd., 549 F.T.C. at 604.
'66 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 793-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 See AREEDA, supra note 162, at 1508a.
168 See id.
169 See, e.g., Mass. Bd., 549 F.T.C. at 604.
170 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dagher v. Saudi Ref.
Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004).
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would have considered what the specific restraints were without allowing the
rule selected, whether "per se" or rule of reason, to determine the outcome.
Second, the Court would have determined if those restraints had the poten-
tial for genuine adverse effects on competition. 7 1 Plaintiffs would have
presented the facts that the joint ventures in question had a national market
share of 15% of all gasoline sales, and more specifically in the western states,
where this dispute originated, Equilon had a market share of over 25%.172
Because defendants were major oil companies with a significant market share,
plaintiffs would likely have succeeded in establishing that the restrictions iden-
tified had at least the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.
Next, assuming plaintiffs met their initial burden of proof, the burden
would have shifted to defendants to establish that these restrictions might be
justified by other procompetitive tendencies or redeeming virtues.173 Defend-
ants made what the Ninth Circuit called a "voluminous record" justifying their
actions. 71 Yet, the defendants would have had a high threshold to reach
because they raised gasoline prices in certain major markets during a time when
crude oil prices hit historic lows.' 7 5 Indeed the Ninth Circuit pointed to the
"absence of persuasive evidence showing a procompetitive justification for ini-
tiating the price-fixing scheme, when viewed along with the plaintiff's evi-
dence showing anticompetitive effects" as its basis for deciding this case under
the "per se" rule. 17 6 The proposed test takes this analysis out of the "per se"
versus "rule of reason" dichotomy with which the Ninth Circuit was stuck. The
proposed rule would adopt this same reasoning of the Ninth Circuit' 77 to deter-
mine the outcome. If defendants could have met their burden, which they
apparently could not have, then the burden would have shifted back to plaintiffs
to demonstrate that the proffered justification was invalid.' Because defend-
ants apparently could not meet their burden, then the restraint in question
would have been found in violation of §1.
In the event that the Court found the defendants could meet their burden,
then plaintiffs would have been required to demonstrate that defendants' prof-
fered justification was invalid in order for the restraint to be in violation of § 1.
171 See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 784 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (determining that the "NCAA's television plan has a sig-
nificant potential for anticompetitive effects" because it "restrains price and output"); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (determining that the
dentist federation's agreement to withhold x rays from insurance companies is anticompeti-
tive); Dagher, 369 F.3d at 111-13.
172 Dagher, 369 F.3d at 11 1.
173 See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 786 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (finding that the NCAA's television plan was not justified
by any "procompetitive efficiencies"); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (finding that the dentist federation's agreement to withhold x-rays from
insurance companies had no "procompetitive effect"); Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1111-13.
171 See Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1111.
175 See id. at 1111-13.
176 Id. at 1122.
177 That reasoning was stated as the "absence of persuasive evidence showing a procompeti-
tive justification for initiating the price-fixing scheme, when viewed along with the plain-
tiff's evidence showing anticompetitive effects." Id.
178 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988).
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If, in such a circumstance, plaintiffs could not demonstrate that defendants'
proffered justification is invalid, then a full "rule of reason" balancing analysis
would have been required.
179
Though the proposed test still allows a possibility for a full traditional rule
of reason analysis at this point, the proposed test is still preferable to the
existing scheme. Under the existing scheme, plaintiffs failure to plead the
alternate "rule of reason" claim prevented the Court from ever considering the
traditional rule of reason. 180 Under the proposed scheme, the traditional rule of
reason could have been reached, regardless of whether plaintiff pleaded it,
because the modified scheme includes this safety valve. The outcome would
have been preferable because, as the Supreme Court has admitted, the "per se"
rule and the rule of reason were never meant to be mutually exclusive, but were
rather meant to be part of a spectrum that allows a court to "form a judgment
about the 'competitive significance' of the restraint."
' 18 1
V. CONCLUSION
Determining the competitive significance of trade restraints may never be
a simple task. Certain restraints may inevitably teeter on the blurry line
between clearly anticompetitive practices and clearly procompetitive practices.
Courts may always have to exercise some degree of discretion when analyzing
such restraints.
The facts of Texaco v. Dagher illustrate a larger problem with the Court's
traditional § 1 analysis. The "per se" rule has been largely abandoned because it
turned out to be potentially unfair to antitrust defendants.1 82 But the pendulum
has swung too far in the opposite direction because the traditional rule of rea-
son creates a potential practical problem of proof for plaintiffs.
1 83
The Court should abandon its traditional two methods of analysis and
adopt a clearer and simpler test that will ensure that § l's purposes are applied
consistently and will encourage plaintiffs to challenge corporations that engage
in questionable trade restraints. If the Court had applied such a test in Texaco
v. Dagher, the Court's decision would have helped the public get to the bottom
of why gasoline prices are so high. Under a clearer and simpler test, plaintiffs
would be able to expose major oil companies' actions if they are violating §1 of
the Sherman Act. If major oil companies are acting legitimately, then the pub-
lic would instead be able to turn its attention to other potential causes of high
gasoline prices and their respective solutions. A clearer and simpler test would
also provide guidance to lower courts, leading to certainty for those courts, for
businesses, and for the consuming public.
179 Id.
180 See Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1127 (Fernandez, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
"I' See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
182 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 794 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the "per se" rule is too abbreviated to allow proper analysis, and that
the plaintiff tends to always win).
183 See id. (finding that the traditional rule of reason requires an antitrust plaintiff to present
every possible fact and theory, and that the case never reaches a conclusion).
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